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Article: 
A bill was recently introduced in the U.S. Senate that would set a cap on wholesale electricity prices in western 
states for the next few years. The bill was introduced by a California Democrat and an Oregon Republican, so it 
appears to have a decent shot at passage. 
 
A few decades ago, such a bill wouldn’t have raised eyebrows. Government intervention in energy and 
electricity markets used to be commonplace. But this law has been proposed as a result of California’s very 
recent attempt to deregulate its electricity markets. 
 
If this confuses you, join the club. Doesn’t deregulation mean not bypassing the market to restrict prices? 
 
Of course it does, and yet deregulation has been getting the blame for the steady melt-down of California’s 
electric-power industry. It’s an unfair accusation, but it threatens to slow progress in 25 other states, including 
North Carolina, that have plans to deregulate their electricity markets. 
 
Before we look at what went wrong in California, let us first review the thinking behind deregulation in general. 
Let me emphasize that I’m not talking about the type of deregulation that eases health, labor, and environmental 
standards, a la President Reagan. The deregulation I want to discuss began a bit earlier, under President Carter, 
and removes government from pricing decisions. 
 
The basic motivation of price deregulation is that market prices are informative. Prices reveal what’s going on 
in a market in ways that government overseers generally cannot replicate, at least not without spending lots of 
money on studies and reports. When a market price is high, that means something. When it falls dramatically, 
that means something too. 
 
When a policy of price deregulation is implemented properly, the results can be impressive. Yet the public may 
not even be aware of what the deregulation has achieved. 
 
During the 1970s, the public was keenly aware of gasoline shortages and other problems associated with the 
OPEC oil embargo and the Iran crisis. U.S. law prevented oil prices from rising high enough to ration out the 
reduced supply of crude oil. The results were gasoline rationing in some states, alternate-day buying, waiting 
lines at gas stations, and many angry people. 
 
But by the time Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, oil prices had been largely deregulated. After the 
invasion, oil prices spiked up sharply due to fears of imminent supply interruptions. Within a couple of months, 
they had doubled. Nobody had any doubt about the message conveyed by the price spike. 
 
But six months after Iraq invaded, prices had fallen back into the neighborhood of their pre-invasion levels. 
Thanks to the flexible-price contracts the industry could now employ, there were no significant shortages and 
no lines at gas stations. And nobody seemed to notice how well the country had been served by that example of 
deregulation. 
Unfortunately, deregulation isn’t always so easy. When U.S. airlines were deregulated in the late 1970s, federal 
officials didn’t consider the effects on individual routes and at individual airports. Airfares have fallen overall, 
but some routes have been monopolized by airlines that have taken advantage of the unregulated parallel market 
for airport gates. 
 
Something similar resulted from federal deregulation of cable television rates in the 1990s. The legislation 
included no provisions to encourage competition at the local level, and consequently local governments have 
tended to grant exclusive franchises to cable companies. (Free public-access channels are among the perks 
provided in exchange for a monopoly.) 
 
But in some areas around the country, both urban and rural, competition among cable companies is the rule. In 
those areas, cable rates are dramatically lower and service is as good as (if not better than) in areas with local 
monopolies. 
 
Developments in the airline and cable-television industries illustrate an important point. A government program 
that only partially deregulates an industry runs the risk of unforeseen and adverse consequences. And that 
brings us back to California and electricity. 
 
The 1996 California law that deregulated the state’s electric-power industry included some interesting 
provisions. The law forced California utilities to sell off much of their generating capacity, thereby requiring 
them to buy electricity on the open market. The law removed price controls on this wholesale market, but not on 
the retail market. And it prohibited utilities from using long-term contracts to buy wholesale electricity, forcing 
them to buy day-to-day on spot markets. 
 
So imagine that you run an electric utility in California. You can no longer generate electricity yourself, so you 
have to buy it. You’re forced to buy on the spot market, so you’re unable to hedge against potentially volatile 
wholesale prices. And if wholesale prices rise significantly, you can’t pass those higher costs on to consumers. 
 
And rise they did. The state of California bet that wholesale electricity prices would fall, and it bet big. Instead, 
wholesale prices rose dramatically due to worldwide price increases for oil and natural gas, the most important 
fuels for electricity generation. 
 
According to the federal Energy Department, wellhead prices of natural gas ranged from $1.50 to $2.30 per 
thousand cubic feet from 1995 through 1999. In early 2000, gas prices began to rise steadily, and by December 
the price had risen to $6.35. A month later in January 2001, natural gas prices were over $8 per thousand cubic 
feet. 
 
In North Carolina, utilities are allowed to pass on increased costs to consumers, as they should be. But 
California’s quasi-deregulation prevented electric utilities from doing so. And the cost there has been much 
higher than mere electricity price increases. Southern California Edison and Pacific Gas & Electric, the state’s 
two major utilities, have lost about $13 billion and are approaching insolvency. 
 
Electricity consumers in California have suffered through rolling black-outs and brown-outs this winter. The 
costs to businesses that depend on a continuous flow of electric power have been enormous. 
 
The state government has had to step in to buy electricity on behalf of its struggling utilities because electricity 
producers are unwilling to sell to them. The state has spent over $3 billion in the wholesale electricity market so 
far, and before long it could deplete a $ 10 billion fund set aside for this purpose. 
 
The state has also done a lot of talking about the electricity market. It has accused the out-of-state electricity 
companies that were invited to buy California power plants (including Charlotte’s Duke Energy) of “price 
gouging.” It has called for the federal government to regulate out-of-state wholesale electricity prices. 
An official of the California Public Utilities Commission was quoted as saying, “we think right now that the 
electricity market is dysfunctional.” He’s right. But the cause of the dysfunction isn’t the evils of the free 
market or the greed of out-of-state electricity companies. The culprit is the state’s own bizarre deregulation 
plan. 
 
The most important lesson North Carolinians can learn from the California debacle is that deregulation, like any 
other government program, can be implemented badly. Electricity deregulation is a complex process, involving 
many difficult issues. 
 
Deregulation doesn’t free public-utilities commissions from having to make tough choices about how many 
power plants to license. Deregulation requires PUCs to deal with the thorny issue of stranded costs, which are 
capital expenditures from years ago that some utilities are still paying off. If a transition to deregulation does 
not compensate for stranded costs, some municipal power companies in North Carolina fear they will be at a 
competitive disadvantage under deregulation. 
 
But if done right, electricity deregulation can generate tremendous benefits. Competition in the production and 
marketing of electricity can yield significantly lower electricity prices than we currently pay. A study by 
Research Triangle Institute has estimated that when all is said and done, the benefits of encouraging such 
competition in North Carolina will outweigh the costs. 
 
However, there’s an important hidden assumption in RTI’s report. It assumes that when North Carolina 
deregulates, it will not do it California-style. 
